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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Deanna D. Cook*
I. JUDICIAL DECISIONS (May 1994 - May 1995)
A. Spousal Support
1. Non-Conforming Payments
It is well known that non-conforming payments or overpay-
ment of support will not entitle a payor spouse to future credit
against his obligations. This continues to be the rule in Virgin-
ia. In the case of Sanford v. Sanford,' the Virginia Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court's decision to credit excess
spousal support payments made by the husband against his
future obligations. The husband agreed to pay spousal support
pursuant to a property settlement agreement, which was in-
corporated into the parties' final divorce decree.2 The husband
was then terminated by his employer, but he received one year
severance pay.' Based upon this change in circumstances, the
parties voluntarily amended their previous agreement and re-
duced the husband's monthly support to $5,600 per month, the
amount of the severance pay.4 The husband's previous employ-
er was to pay the support directly to the wife.5
After the spousal support order was amended, the husband
* Bremner & Janus, Richmond, Virginia; BA, 1988, University of Richmond,
Westhampton College; J.D., 1991, University of Richmond, T.C. Williams School of
Law.
1. 19 Va. App. 241, 244, 450 S.E.2d 185, 187 (1994).
2. Id.
3. 1L
4. Id.
5. Id.
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obtained a consulting job.' He then informed his wife that he
would send her an additional $3,100 per month for nine
months, and that he intended for these additional payments to
be credited against his future monthly support obligations.! He
also requested that the wife agree to reduce his support obliga-
tions to $3,100 per month after the severance pay ended.8 The
wife did not agree to these terms, although she accepted and
cashed the additional checks? The husband made the addition-
al payments, noting on each check that the check was written
for spousal support for the respective month." After the sever-
ance pay eaided, the husband continued to pay his wife $3,100
per month through the end of the year." During this time, the
court's decree requiring the husband to pay the $5,600 per
month remained in effect.' In January of the following year,
the husband stopped sending any support payments. 3
The wife filed a petition to show cause alleging that the
husband was in arrears in excess of $24,000.'1 The husband
claimed that he was entitled to a credit for the additional pay-
ments of $3,100 per month that he had made in excess of his
court-ordered obligation. 5 The trial court agreed, reasoning
that the wife had ratified the agreement by cashing and accept-
ing the payments."
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the wife's actual
contractual consent, or her passive acquiescence, did not excuse
the husband's non-compliance with the court's alimony de-
cree.'" The court of appeals reasoned that "[t]o permit [the
husband] to increase the amount of the specified payments at
one time, reduce them at another, and require an adjustment of
the differences in the future, would lead to continuous trouble
6. Id.
7. Id. at 244, 450 S.E.2d at 187-88.
8. Id. at 244, 450 S.E.2d at 188.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 245, 450 S.E.2d at 188.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 248, 450 S.E.2d at 189 (citing Richardson v. Moore, 217 Va. 422, 423,
229 S.E.2d 864, 865 (1976)).
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and turmoil.18 The court also found that this type of arrange-
ment would deprive the wife of the future benefit of the
amount of support which the court originally found proper."9
According to the court, the remedy in these situations continues
to be to petition the court for a modification of the decree."
2. Imputed Income
In the case of Konefal v. Konefal,21 the court of appeals af-
firmed the trial court's award of spousal support to the wife
despite the husband's claim that the wife was voluntarily un-
deremployed. The court agreed with the trial court's finding
that the wife was not voluntarily underemployed, 22 but reiter-
ated that "a party seeking spousal support must earn as much
as he or she reasonably can to reduce the amount of the sup-
port needed, and may not choose a low paying position that pe-
nalizes the other spouse."' The court also stated that under
appropriate circumstances a court may impute income to the
party seeking spousal support.'
3. Lump-Sum Spousal Support
The court of appeals in Moseley v. Moseley25 reversed the
trial court's lump sum award of spousal support to the wife
where the husband had been discharged of all marital debt by
the bankruptcy court. The husband claimed that the record was
insufficient to prove he had enough money to pay a lump sum
award.2' The court pointed out that "although the trial judge
18. Id. at 246, 450 S.E.2d at 188 (quoting Newton v. Newton, 202 Va. 515, 519,
118 S.E.2d 656, 659 (1961)).
19. Id
20. Id. at 246, 450 S.E.2d at 189 (citing Fearon v. Fearon, 207 Va. 927, 931, 154
S.E.2d 165, 168 (1967)).
21. 18 Va. App. 612, 613, 446 S.E.2d 153, 154 (1994).
22. Id. at 614, 446 S.E.2d at 154. The wife was continuously earning income from
1973 to 1991, during which time her income increased from $30,100 per year to
$72,772 per year. Id.
23. Id. (citing Srinivasan v. Srinivasan, 10 Va. App. 728, 734, 386 S.E.2d 675,
679 (1990)).
24. Id.
25. 19 Va. App. 192, 196, 450 S.E.2d 161, 164 (1994).
26. Id.
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characterized the award as 'lump sum spousal support,' he
specifically listed as its purpose 'to compensate [wife]' for [one-
half of the mortgage payments], '[half] of the debt to the credit
union and [half] of all other secured and unsecured marital
debt.'" 7 The court of appeals found that the trial court's intent
to hold the husband financially responsible for one-half of all of
the marital debt was clear and that this "would, [in] effect,
serve to circumvent the discharge granted by the federal bank-
ruptcy court."28 Furthermore, the court found that "the evi-
dence before the trial court did not establish that [the] husband
had the ability to pay a lump sum award in favor of [the]
wife."29 Therefore, the award was reversed. °
B. Attorney Fees
In Gottlieb v. Gottlieb,3 the court of appeals remanded the
case to determine the amount of attorney's fees to be paid to
the wife for defending the husband's appeal. The court of ap-
peals determined that the questions presented and issues raised
by the husband were without merit because all were either
within the sound discretion of the trial judge with no evidence
of an abuse of discretion or were not properly briefed or pre-
served for appeal. 2 Having made this determination, the court
of appeals found that compensation to the wife for having to
defend the appeal was appropriate.33
27. Id. at 196-97, 450 S.E.2d at 164.
28. Id. at 197, 450 S.E.2d at 164.
29. Id. "[T]he trial court 'must consider the relative needs and abilities of the
parties.'" Id. (quoting Collier v. Collier, 2 Va. App. 125, 129, 341 S.E.2d 827, 829
(1986)). The trial court has "discretion in deciding whether to order periodic or lump
sum payments." Id. See also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995). Although
periodic payments are the preferred form, 'when courts do make lump sum spousal
support awards they do so because of special circumstances or compelling reasons.-
Moseley, 19 Va. App. at 197, 450 S.E.2d at 164 (quoting Blank v. Blank, 10 Va. App.
1, 5-6, 389 S.E.2d 723, 725 (1990)).
30. Moseley, 19 Va. App. at 198, 450 S.E.2d at 165.
31. 19 Va. App. 77, 95-96, 448 S.E.2d 666, 667 (1994).
32. Id. at 95, 448 S.E.2d at 677.
33. Id.
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C. Property Settlement Agreements
1. Separation Agreements
a. College Tuition
Agreements requiring either spouse to pay for a college edu-
cation must be meticulously drafted. In Jones v. Jones,' the
court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling ordering a
father, pursuant to a separation agreement, to pay for sixty
percent of his children's college educations. The father had the
right to veto the children's choice of schools under the terms of
the agreement, which provided as follows:
Both parties recognize the issue of college educations for the
children, and Husband shall contribute sixty percent (60%)
and Wife shall contribute forty percent (40%) to the college
education of both children. Both parents shall agree on the
college of attendance and the children shall make satisfacto-
ry progress in that college program ......
The agreement was incorporated into the parties' final di-
vorce decree.36 At the time the decree was entered, the daugh-
ter was already in college." The following year, with the mu-
tual consent of her parents, she transferred to another
school.3 8 In her junior year, she again changed schools. 9 Al-
though the daughter discussed this additional change with her
father and anticipated graduation within the five year period,'
her father did not consent to her transfer, and thus he refused
to pay any portion of her educational expenses at the new insti-
tution.41 Meanwhile, the son also enrolled at a school without
his father's approval.' Although the father did not consent to
34. 19 Va. App. 265, 450 S.E.2d 762 (1994).
35. Id. at 266, 450 S.E.2d at 762.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 267, 450 S.E.2d at 762.
38. Id. at 267, 450 S.E.2d at 762-63.
39. Id at 267, 450 S.E.2d at 763.
40. The agreement provided that parental assistance would cease after 5 years.
Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. The father rejected the son's choice of school as beyond his financial
1995] 997
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the children's schools, the mother acceded to both children's
selections.'
The mother eventually filed a show cause order against the
father in circuit court for his failure to pay his portion of the
children's educations." The father testified at trial that "he
had become estranged from [his children] and had 'no input'
into their college selection process.' He maintained that under
the separation agreement his consent to the selection of the
college was a prerequisite for his contribution.46 Nevertheless,
the trial court ruled that the father had unreasonably withheld
his consent to the children's school selections, and ordered him
to pay his share.47
The court of appeals opined that if the case were based solely
on a "fairness" standard, the father should be ordered to pay.48
However, the court reversed the lower court's decision, ruling
that the trial court was not at liberty to supply additional
terms to the separation agreement.49 The language of the con-
tract predicated the father's obligation on his agreement to the
selection of the school.5" Therefore, the father did not have to
pay where he had not agreed to his children's choice of
school.5
b. Child Support Waivers
The Supreme Court of Virginia strengthened the trend to-
ward requiring both parents to contribute to their children's
means. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 267-68, 450 S.E.2d at 763.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 268-69, 450 S.E.2d at 764-65.
50. Id. at 269-70, 450 S.E.2d at 764. The court distinguished this case from Tiffa-
ny v. Tiffany, 1 Va. App. 11, 332 S.E.2d 796 (1985) where the court found that the
particular agreement did not provide a "veto" right for the father. The agreement did
provide that "as an express condition of the Husband's obligation, the Husband shall
be entitled to participate in the decision making process as to the college to be at-
tended." Jones, 19 Va. App. at 269, 450 S.E.2d at 764 (quoting Tiffany, 1 Va. App. at
16-17, 332 S.E.2d at 800).
51. Jones, 19 Va. App. at 270, 450 S.E.2d at 765.
998 [Vol. 29:993
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support despite a contrary agreement. In Kelley v. Kelley,52 the
supreme court reversed the court of appeals' ruling that a trial
court lacked jurisdiction to alter the terms of a property settle-
ment agreement which indemnified and held the husband
harmless from paying child support. The parties' final divorce
decree incorporated their property settlement agreement which
provided that the wife would receive all of the equity in the
home in exchange for the husband never having to pay child
support." However, several years later, the wife petitioned the
trial court for child support." The trial court ordered the hus-
band to pay support and denied his motion to have the wife
indemnify and reimburse him.55 The husband appealed and
the court of appeals held that the trial court had no jurisdiction
after twenty-one days to modify the terms of the decree."
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the provision in
the agreement was "null and void because it is violative of
clearly established law.""7 The court reasoned that "[b]oth par-
ents owe a duty of support to their minor children.""8 Conse-
quently, they cannot contract away their children's rights to
support, nor can they preclude a court from exercising its power
52. 248 Va. 295, 299, 449 S.E.2d 55, 57 (1994).
53. See'id. 248 Va. at 296-97, 449 S.E.2d at 55-56. The specific provision reads as
follows:
The parties hereto agree, in consideration of Husband relinquishing
all of his equity in the jointly-owned marital home, that Husband shall
never be responsible for payment of child support. The [Wife] covenants
and agrees never to file a petition in any Court requesting that [Hus-
band] be placed under a child support Order because [Wife] has accepted
all of [Husband's] equity in lieu of requesting child support.
In the event [Wife] should ever petition any Court of competent
jurisdiction for support and maintenance of [the children], and should a
court grant any such child support award, the said [Wife] hereby cove-
nants and agrees to pay directly to [Husband] any amount of support
that he is directed to pay to any party. In other words, [Wife] is agree-
ing to hold harmless Husband from the payment of any amount of child
support, regardless of the circumstances under which he is paying same.
Id.
54. Id. at 297, 449 S.E.2d at 56.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 298, 449 S.E.2d at 56.
58. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-61 (Repl. Vol. 1995); Featherston v. Brooks,
220 Va. 443, 448, 258 S.E.2d 513, 516 (1979)).
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to order child support.59 Therefore, that portion of the agree-
ment was void and could be challenged at any time.0
2. Revocation
A provision in a written agreement which provides that the
agreement will remain in effect in the event of a reconciliation
is enforceable after a reconciliation and subsequent separation.
In Smith v. Smith,6 the parties' agreement provided that in
the event of a reconciliation and resumption of the marital
relationship, the provisions of the agreement would remain in
full force and effect. The parties reconciled, and then separated
a year later.62 The court of appeals held that "[any uncertain-
ty on this question has been resolved by [statute]. The Premari-
tal Agreement Act provides that such an agreement 'may be
amended or revoked only by a written agreement signed by the
parties.'"63 The court pointed out that "[tihis provision applies
also to agreements entered into by married persons." " There-
fore, when couples reconcile after signing a property settlement
agreement, they must terminate that agreement in writing.'
3. Premarital Agreements
Premarital agreements that were entered into prior to 1985
are valid if otherwise valid as contracts. In Carpenter v. Car-
penter,66 the court of appeals upheld the trial court's decision
to nullify a premarital agreement where the husband had not
made a full disclosure of his assets to the wife. Since the agree-
59. Id.
60. Id. at 298, 449 S.E.2d at 56.
61. 19 Va. App. 155, 156, 449 S.E.2d 506, 506 (1994).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 157, 449 S.E.2d at 507 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-153 (Repl. Vol.
1995)).
64. Id. Virginia Code § 20-155 provides that "[miarried persons may enter into
agreements with each other for the purpose of settling the rights and obligations of
either or both of them, to the same extent, with the same effect, and subject to the
same conditions, as provided in §§ 20-147 through 20-154 for agreements between
prospective spouses." VA. CODE ANN. § 20-155 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
65. Smith, 19 Va. App. at 157, 449 S.E.2d at 507.
66. 19 Va. App. 147, 148-49, 449 S.E.2d 502, 503 (1994).
1000 [Vol. 29:993
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ment predated the 1985 Premarital Agreement Act,6" the court
of appeals relied on the legal principles set forth in Batleman v.
Rubin," in determining the validity of the premarital agree-
ment.9 Prior to the enactment of the Premarital Agreement
Act, a premarital agreement had to contain fair and reasonable
provisions for the wife, or the husband had to give a ful and
frank disclosure of his worth to the wife. ° A premarital
agreement also had to be signed freely and voluntarily on com-
petent and independent advice.7
The husband in Carpenter stipulated that the premarital
agreement was signed by his wife without a full disclosure of
his assets and without independent legal representation. 2 The
agreement made no financial provision for the wife.73 There-
fore, the agreement was not enforceable as a contract, and the
trial court was correct in disregarding it and determining equi-
table distribution.74
A different result was reached in Rogers v. Yourshaw.7 In
that case, the court of appeals upheld the trial court's finding
that the parties' antenuptial agreement was valid.6 In Rogers,
the wife, a legal secretary and law student at the time, signed
the agreement five days before the wedding ceremony without
consulting counsel.7 Eventually the parties divorced." The
trial court ruled that the antenuptial agreement was a valid
and enforceable contract.7 The wife appealed asserting among
other things, that the agreement was unconscionable. 0 The
67. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-147 to -154 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
68. 199 Va. 156, 98 S.E.2d 519 (1957).
69. Carpenter, 19 Va. App. at 150, 449 S.E.2d at 503-04.
70. Id. (citing Batleman, 199 Va. at 158, 98 S.E.2d at 521).
71. Id (citing Batleman, 199 Va. at 158, 98 S.E.2d at 521). Since parties engaged
to be married are not considered to be dealing at arms length, they are required to
make a full and frank disclosure of all facts and circumstances involving the property
rights to be affected by such a settlement. Id. at 152, 449 S.E.2d at 504-05 (citing
Batleman, 199 Va. at 160, 98 S.E.2d at 522).
72. Id. at 149, 449 S.E.2d at 503.
73. Id. at 150, 449 S.E.2d at 504.
74. Id. at 151-52, 449 S.E.2d at 504-05.
75. 18 Va. App. 816, 448 S.E.2d 884 (1994).
76. Id. at 818, 448 S.E.2d at 885.
77. Id. at 818-19, 448 S.E.2d at 885.
78. Id. at 819, 448 S.E.2d at 886.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 822, 448 S.E.2d at 887.
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evidence substantiated that the wife was of sound and intelli-
gent mind when the parties entered into the agreement.8' Al-
though the wife was not as legally sophisticated as the hus-
band, the court found that "she was certainly not totally with-
out some knowledge of the law."82 At the time of the agree-
ment, the wife worked at a law firm and had just completed a
course in contract law.83 Furthermore, the court determined
that the husband had not acted in bad faith, misled his wife, or
concealed any material provisions of the agreement.' The wife
also was afforded the opportunity to obtain counsel, but de-
clined to do so.85
The court found that "[a]lthough [the] wife's career has taken
a different direction than she envisioned when she signed the
agreement ... '[C]ourts cannot relieve one of the consequences
of a contract, merely because it was unwise." Moreover, the
subsequent change in the law allowing for equitable distribu-
tion did not justify a unilateral rejection of the agreement."
The court warned that "[a] quid pro quo of entering into a com-
prehensive agreement is the 'possibility that the law may then
change in one's favor."'88
D. Child Custody
In the most newsworthy case of the year, the supreme court
reversed the court of appeals and upheld the trial court's award
of a child's custody to the maternal grandmother rather than
the lesbian mother." In Bottoms v. Bottoms, the court of ap-
81. Id. at 823, 448 S.E.2d at 888.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. (quoting Derby v. Derby, 8 Va. App. 19, 30, 378 S.E.2d 74, 80 (1989) and
citing Kaufman v. Kaufman, 7 Va. App. 488, 501, 375 S.E.2d 374, 381 (1988) ("A
court is not at liberty to rewrite a contract simply because the contract may appear
to reach an unfair result.")).
87. Id. (citation omitted). The statutes allowing equitable distribution did not
come into effect until after the signing of the agreement. Id. at 823-24, 448 S.E.2d at
888. See also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
88. Rogers, 18 Va. App. at 823, 448 S.E.2d at 888 (quoting Bragan v. Bragan, 4
Va. App. 516, 519, 358 S.E.2d 757, 759 (1987)).
89. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 249 Va. 410, 457 S.E.2d 102 (1995), rev'g, 18 Va. App.
1002 [Vol. 29:993
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peals found that "the evidence [was] insufficient to support the
trial court's decision to remove custody of a three-year-old child
from his natural parent, the mother, and to grant custody to a
third party, the child's maternal grandmother."" The court of
appeals determined that the evidence failed to prove that the
child's mother abused or neglected her son.9 The court also
found that the evidence failed to prove that the mother's lesbi-
an relationship had, or would have, "a deleterious effect on her
son, or that she was an unfit parent."92 The court of appeals
held the standard involving custody to a third party is that
unless a parent, by his or her conduct or condition, is unfit
or is unable and unwilling to provide or care for a child, a
court is not entitled to consider whether a third party
might be better able to care for a child... Even when the
parental level of care may be marginally satisfactory, courts
may not take custody of a child from his or her parents
simply because a third party may be willing and able to
provide better care for the child.93
The court of appeals did recognize that "[a] parent's sexual
behavior, particularly a parent's sexual indiscretions, in a
child's presence is conducted which may render a parent unfit
to have custody of a child."94 Nevertheless, the court of appeals
in this case found insufficient evidence that the mother's lesbi-
an relationship had any deleterious effect on the child and
reversed the trial court's decision. 5
481, 444 S.E.2d 276 (1994).
90. 18 Va. App. 481, 484, 444 S.E.2d 276, 278 (1994).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 488, 444 S.E.2d at 280.
94. Id. at 490, 444 S.E.2d at 282 (citing Ford v. Ford, 14 Va. App. 551, 554, 419
S.E.2d 415, 417 (1992) and Sutherland v. Sutherland, 14 Va. App. 42, 43, 414 S.E.2d
617, 618 (1992)).
95. Id. at 493-94, 444 S.E.2d at 283-84; Doe v. Doe, 222 Va. 736, 746, 284 S.E.2d
799, 805 (1981) (holding that adverse effects of a parent's homosexuality on a child
cannot be assumed without specific proof). 'The trial court noted that Sharon
Bottoms' admission that she engaged in weekly oral sex with her lover violated Code
§ 18.2-361 ("crimes against nature") which makes sodomy a Class 6 felony." Bottoms,
18 Va. App. at 492 n.2, 444 S.E.2d at 282 n.2. However, the court of appeals also
recognized that "[iun Sutherland, [it] permitted a mother living in an adulterous rela-
tionship to retain custody of her children over the natural father's objections despite
the fact that adultery is a crime in Virginia." Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-365
(Repl. Vol. 1988) and Sutherland v. Sutherland, 14 Va. App. at 43, 414 S.E.2d at 618
1995] 1003
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The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, finding that "It]he
court of appeals failed to give proper deference upon appellate
review to the trial court's factual findings, and misapplied the
law to the facts."9 The supreme court found the record con-
tained more than sufficient information to rebut the parental
presumption and prove that the mother was an unfit custodi-
an.97 The supreme court stated that it has previously ruled
that a lesbian mother is not per se an unfit parent." Never-
theless, "[c]onduct inherent in lesbianism is punishable as a
Class 6 felony in the Commonwealth... thus that conduct is
another important consideration in determining custody."99 The
supreme court found that the record showed that although the
mother was "devoted to her son," [she] refuses to subordinate
her own desires and priorities to the child's welfare."'00
The court also found that unlike the Doe case, the child in
Bottoms had been harmed by the conditions under which he
lived with his mother.' °' The supreme court did not overlook
the mother's lesbian relationship, and it repeated its previous
position, "that living daily under conditions stemming from
active lesbianism practiced in the home may impose a burden
upon a child by reason of the 'social condemnation' attached to
such an arrangement, which will inevitably afflict the child's re-
lationships with its 'peers and with the community at
large.""0'
In Hughes v. Gentry,0 3 the court of appeals upheld the trial
court's decision to change custody from the mother to the father
and Brinkley v. Brinkley, 1 Va. App. 222, 224, 336 S.E.2d 901, 902 (1985). ("[A]n
adulterous relationship, 'without more, is an insufficient basis upon which to find that
a parent is an unfit custodian of his or her child.-')).
96. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 299 Va. 410, 419, 457 S.E.2d 102, 107.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 419, 457 S.E.2d at 108 (citing Doe v. Doe, 222 Va. 736, 748, 284
S.E.2d 799, 806 (1991)).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 420, 457 S.E.2d at 108.
102. Id. (quoting Roe v. Roe, 228 Va. 722, 728, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (1985)). Three
judges in Bottoms dissented, stating that "the trial court made a per se finding of
unfitness based on the mother's homosexual conduct," and that it would have re-
versed the decision on the basis that the trial court applied the wrong rule of law.
Id. at 421-22, 457 S.E.2d at 109.
103. 18 Va. App. 318, 443 S.E.2d 448 (1994).
1004 [Vol. 29:993
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because the mother was intending to relocate outside the Com-
monwealth of Virginia. After the parties in Hughes separated,
custody of both children was awarded to the mother, who sub-
sequently remarried.' Two daughters were born during the
mother's second marriage."5 The first husband had liberal vis-
itation with both of his sons; however, this case only concerns
itself with one of the children.' 6 In upholding the change in
custody, the court of appeals restated the "well settled law that
a court may forbid a custodial parent from removing a child
from the state without the court's permission."' ' The ratio-
nale supporting this law is that when "the relocation of the
custodial parent is not in the child's best interests, the reloca-
tion of the custodial parent constitutes a material change of cir-
cumstances."'
The mother argued that the child should not be separated
from his other siblings and that in order to do so the father
had to show "compelling cause."'" The court found that al-
though the separation of siblings is an important factor to con-
sider, there does not need to be "compelling cause .. .where it
is not otherwise in the best interests of the individual child to
be placed in separate custody.""' The court of appeals found
that ample evidence existed in the trial court record to show
that the change in custody would be in the best interest of the
child, despite the fact that he would be separated from his half
siblings."'
104. Id. at 320, 443 S.E.2d at 450.
105. Id-
106. Id.
107. Id. at 322, 443 S.E.2d at 451 (citing Carpenter v. Carpenter, 220 Va. 299,
302, 257 S.E.2d 845, 847 (1979)). Alternatively, a court "may permit the child to be
removed from the state." Id. (citing Gray v. Gray, 228 Va. 696, 698-99, 324 S.E.2d
677, 678 (1985)).
108. Id. at 322, 443 S.E.2d at 451 (citing Wilson v. Wilson, 12 Va. App. 1251,
1255, 408 S.E.2d 576, 579 (1991)).
109. Id. at 323, 443 S.E.2d at 451.
110. Id- at 323-24, 443 S.E.2d at 451-52.
111. Id. at 324, 443 S.E.2d at 452.
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E. Child Support
Although the Code of Virginia provides for the inclusion of
capital gains as income when calculating child support, it is not
always the rule. In Smith v. Smith," the court of appeals af-
firmed the trial court's child support calculation despite the
mother's contention that the trial court had erred in not includ-
ing capital gains as income to the husband."' The mother al-
so appealed the trial court's refusal to order the husband to
continue to pay for the child's private school."4
The parties filed for divorce in 1991."' During 1991, the
husband sold marital stocks and realized approximately
$165,000 in capital gains but the husband had no capital gains
income after September 30, 1991, prior to the support hear-
ing."6 The court did not consider the capital gains as income
to the husband when calculating child support."7 The court
pointed out that the statute requiring the inclusion of capital
gains "contains 'no express contemporaneous requirement, and
literal compliance with the terms of the statute could be inter-
preted to require inclusion of capital gains, bonuses, or other
irregular forms of income received many years prior to the sup-
port proceedings.""' However, the court of appeals declined to
accept this interpretation, reasoning that "[tihis would result in
the artificial inflation of income, which clearly would not affect
the intent of the legislature.""9 Therefore, the court held "that
where the evidence showed that the realization of capital gains
was an irregular occurrence and was not contemporaneous with
112. 18 Va. App. 427, 444 S.E.2d 269 (1994).
113. Id. at 428, 444 S.E.2d at 271; see VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2(C) (Repl. Vol.
1995) (stating that "'gross income' .. . shall include ... commissions, royalties, bo-
nuses .... capital gains," and the like).
114. 18 Va. App. at 435, 444 S.E.2d at 275.
115. Id. at 429, 444 S.E.2d at 271.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 434, 444 S.E.2d at 274.
118. Id.
119. Id. The court further reasoned that "[elven if the capital gains at issue had
been realized contemporaneously such that the court would have been required to
include them, it nevertheless would have been justified in deviating downward from
the presumptive amount of support to reach the same result." Id. at 435, 444 S.E.2d
at 274.
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the support proceeding, the trial judge did not abuse his discre-
tion by failing to include the gains in calculating gross monthly
income.""
The court also upheld the trial court's refusal to order the
non-custodial parent to pay for the children's private school."2
The court held that "[i]mplicit in the statutory scheme is that
educational expenses are included in the presumptive amount of
child support as calculated under the code."2
In L.C.S. v. S.A.S., 2 the court of appeals reversed the trial
court's refusal to award child support to the wife where the
husband was incarcerated but owned property from which he
could derive income. The parties, who had been married for
twenty years, had two children, an emancipated daughter and a
minor son.' The husband, an attorney, had been "the prima-
ry income producer for the family."" However, "[i]n 1992, the
husband was convicted of three felony sexual offenses with
minor boys,"" for which he received a ten-year sentence and
lost his license to practice law."
"The parties stipulated that the marital estate for equitable
distribution purposes was $1,027,758.40," which was divided
equally between the parties." However, the wife's request for
120. Id. at 434, 444 S.E.2d at 274.
Recognizing the possibility that various aspects of the equitable distribu-
tion and other divorce proceedings could result in artificial inflation of
the parties' gross monthly incomes as calculated under Code § 20-
108.2(C), the legislature expressly allowed for downward deviation from
the presumptive amount of child support if these calculations included
"Ielxtraordinary capital gains such as capital gains resulting from the
sale of the marital abode."
Id. at 435, 444 S.E.2d at 274-75 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.1(B)(7) (Repl. Vol.
1995)).
121. Id. at 435, 444 S.E.2d at 275.
122. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.1 (B)(6) (Repl. Vol. 1995) (stating that
"[d]irect payments ordered by the court for . .. education" expenses provides grounds
to deviate from the presumptive amount of support).
123. 19 Va. App. 709, 453 S.E.2d 580 (1995).
124. Id. at 712, 453 S.E.2d at 582.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 713, 453 S.E.2d at 583. The parties' son also alleged that the father
had abused him. Id. at 714, 453 S.E.2d at 583.
127. Id. at 714, 453 S.E.2d at 583.
128. Id.
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child and spousal support was denied 9 because the trial
court calculated that the husband had no income in accordance
with the child support guidelines under section 20-108.2 of the
Virginia Code. 13 0 According to the court of appeals, "[tihe trial
judge refused to impute income to [the] husband under Code §
20-108.1(B)(3) because he determined that [the] husband's in-
carceration was not the equivalent of [the] husband's being
'voluntarily unemployed."""' The court also pointed out that
"[elven though the [trial] court determined that [the] husband's
assets had the potential to generate some income, as much as
$15,000 per year, the court refused to deviate from the pre-
sumptive amount under Code § 20-108.1(B)." 13 2
Although the court of appeals declined to decide whether an
incarcerated parent is "voluntarily unemployed" under section
20-108.1(B)(3), the court determined that the trial court abused
its discretion in failing to award child support," and, there-
fore, it remanded the case for consideration of the husband's
financial resources in calculating support."M In doing so, the
court of appeals stated that "[a] court must consider the factors
in Code § 20-108.1(B) in deciding whether to deviate from the
presumptive amount. These factors include (1) '[tlhe earning
capacity, obligations and needs, and financial resources of each
parent.'"'35 The court also stated that "[i]n determining the
ability of a spouse, and thus a parent, to pay support, a court
must consider any assets owned by the spouse or parent as
well as their 'actual earnings and his capacity to earn, whether
from his personal exertions or his property.""' The court of
129. Id.
130. Id. at 716, 453 S.E.2d at 584.
131. Id. at 716, 453 S.E.2d at 583. The trial court found that
'[tihe acts that have lead to his inability to earn are voluntary acts on
his part. But the fact that he is in prison and is unable to earn is not
voluntary on his part; he fought it tooth and nail. . . . I don't believe
under those circumstances I can impute income to him."
Id.
132. Id. at 716, 453 S.E.2d at 584.
133. Id. at 719, 453 S.E.2d at 585.
134. Id. at 718-19, 453 S.E.2d at 585.
135. Id. at 717, 453 S.E.2d at 584-85 (emphasis in original) (citing VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-108.1(B)(11) (Repl. Vol. 1995).
136. Id. (quoting Robertson v. Robertson, 215 Va. 425, 427, 211 S.E.2d 41, 44
(1975)).
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appeals found that the father, even though incarcerated, had
definite financial resources, including the value of his assets
from the equitable distribution award and the potential income
from those assets."' The husband's portion of the marital es-
tate could produce at least $15,000 per year in income, and the
wife established her need for support.'38 Therefore, even
though the presumptive guideline was zero, the father had
financial resources to pay support, and a "deviation from the
guidelines was appropriate, if not required."'3 9
In Pharo v. Pharo,'° the court of appeals reversed the trial
court's upward deviation from the shared custody guidelines
where there were no written findings or explanations other
than the trial court's statement that "application of the statuto-
ry 'shared custody calculations would seriously impair the
[wife's] ability to maintain minimal adequate housing and pro-
vide other basic necessities for the child."".' The court of ap-
peals held that in cases where the shared custody guidelines
apply, there is a rebuttable presumption that the amount is
correct. Although there can be a deviation, sufficient written
findings must exist in the order to justify the deviation.' The
court's conclusory statements in this case were insufficient to
support such deviation.' 4
In Calvert v. Calvert,' the trial court incorrectly computed
the husband's gross income by including depreciation expenses,
which he deducted on his federal income tax return. Section 20-
108.2(C) defines income that shall be considered for the purpose
of determining child support, and includes income "from all
sources."' The court of appeals stated that "[b]y definition
137. Id. at 718, 453 S.E.2d at 585.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 19 Va. App. 236, 450 S.E.2d 183 (1994).
141. Id. at 239, 450 S.E.2d at 184. Virginia Code § 20-108.2 provides that "[any
calculation under this subdivision shall not create or reduce a support obligation to
an amount which seriously impairs the custodial parent's ability to maintain minimal
adequate housing and provide other basic necessities for the child." VA. CODE ANN. §
20-108.2 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
142. Pharo, 19 Va. App. at 238, 450 S.E.2d at 184.
143. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2(A) (Repl. Vol. 1995)); see infra part
H.B.3.
144. Id. at 239-40, 450 S.E.2d at 185.
145. 18 Va. App. 781, 785, 447 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1994).
146. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2(A) (Repl. Vol. 1995); see Calvert 18 Va. App. at
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and under Code § 20-108.2(C), business expenses and deprecia-
tion are not income." " 7 Moreover, the court explained that
"[t]the statute expressly provides that reasonable business ex-
penses shall be deducted from income for a self-employed per-
son when determining gross income.""~
In an effort to help the wife save money on her tax burden,
the court also deviated upward from the child support guide-
lines and set child support in excess of the guidelines, while
lowering the wife's spousal support. The court of appeals
held that "[t]he income tax burden of an award of spousal sup-
port is not an acceptable justification for deviating from the
presumptive amount of child support."5 '
In Carter v. Thornhill," ' the court of appeals upheld the
trial court's order which required a former husband to pay
forty-five percent of a child's previously accrued medical expens-
es even though the court order did not require him to do so.
This award was characterized as a prospective, rather than as
a retroactive, modification. "2 The trial court held that the
non-custodial parent could be held liable for a portion of his
daughter's catastrophic medical expenses incurred after child
support was set and before the modification petition was
filed. 153
The Carter case involved two parties whose sixteen-year-old
daughter was involved in a severe automobile accident and
received continuing medical care until her death.TM A child
support order was in effect prior to the accident, but it did not
order the father to pay any portion of the child's medical ex-
penses.'55 The trial court subsequently entered a final order
requiring the father to pay to the mother forty-five percent of
785, 447 S.E.2d at 877.
147. Calvert, 18 Va. App. at 785, 447 S.E.2d at 877.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 786, 447 S.E.2d .at 877.
150. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Floyd v. Floyd, 17 Va. App. 222, 231-32, 436
S.E.2d 457, 463 (1993) and Dietz v. Dietz, 17 Va. App. 203, 207-08, 436 S.E.2d 463,
466 (1993)).
151. 19 Va. App. 501, 512, 453 S.E.2d 295, 302 (1995).
152. Id. at 506, 453 S.E.2d at 298.
153. Id. at 503, 453 S.E.2d at 298.
154. Id. at 503-04, 453 S.E.2d at 297.
155. Id.
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the daughter's stipulated medical expenses plus interest.
The court of appeals found that this was not an abuse of
discretion,"7 and due to the circumstances, the lump sum
award was proper.5 s The trial court also held that it would
be both illogical and unjust to release a non-custodial parent
from the obligation to pay a portion of his or her child's cata-
strophic medical expenses incurred after a child support order
has been set and before a modification petition has been
filed.
59
F. Bankruptcy
There is now an exception to the old rule that there was no
way to prevent a spouse from discharging his or her obligations
under a written agreement. The court of appeals now has made
it possible to circumvent the possibility of a payor spouse dis-
charging in bankruptcy obligations under a property settlement
agreement. 60 In Carter v. Carter, the court of appeals af-
firmed the trial court's determination of equitable distribution,
even though the bankruptcy court had discharged the husband
from his obligations under a written property settlement agree-
ment.'6 ' The parties entered into an agreement, which pro-
vided that "[i]f either party fails in the due performance of any
of his or her obligations ... the other shall have the right to
sue for damages ... or to rescind [the] [a]greement."'62
156. Id. at 504, 453 S.E.2d at 298.
157. Id. at 505, 453 S.E.2d at 298.
158. Id. at 507, 453 S.E.2d at 299.
159. Id. The court went on to state that "[n]oncustodial parents are not relieved of
all obligations to a child other than court-ordered child support merely because they
do not have physical custody. It is axiomatic that parents are responsible for the cost
of necessities provided a child, including necessary medical expenses." Id. (citing Mo-
ses v. Akers, 203 Va. 130, 132, 122 S.E.2d 864, 866 (1961)). The court also reasoned
that if the mother had refused to pay the uninsured expenses, a third party could
have sued and obtained a judgment against the father for the full amount. Id. There-
fore, the father should not be released from his obligation to pay his fair share of the
bills simply because the mother had already paid them. Id.
160. Carter v. Carter, 18 Va. App. 787, 447 S.E.2d 522 (1994).
161. Id. at 789, 447 S.E.2d at 523.
162. Id. at 788, 447 S.E.2d at 522.
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After entering into the written agreement, the husband filed
a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. 6' He was dis-
charged from his debts, including the debt to his wife under the
agreement.'" After the bankruptcy case was closed, the wife
fied a petition for divorce and moved to rescind the property
settlement agreement.' 6' The trial court granted her motion
and "ordered the sale of the jointly owned marital home with
equal division of the net proceeds."'66 The trial court also or-
dered the husband to pay the wife a monetary award and a
portion of her attorney's fees. 67 The husband appealed, ar-
guing "that he was entitled to the benefit of the separation
agreement, which insulated him from obligation to [the wife]"
due to the bankruptcy court's discharge."
The court of appeals agreed that the debt was validly dis-
charged by the bankruptcy court.'6' However, the court of ap-
peals held that by accepting the discharge from his obligations
under the agreement, the husband had repudiated the agree-
ment, and therefore the wife had the right to rescind the agree-
ment.' o
G. Procedure
The court of appeals in Decker v. Decker 7' restated for the
first time in many years that when a case is on appeal from
the circuit court to the court of appeals, the circuit court loses
jurisdiction to modify an award. A trial court may enforce a
support and custody order, but it may not modify such an order
without leave of the appellate court.72 The court of appeals
163. Id. at 788, 447 S.E.2d at 523.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 789, 447 S.E.2d at 523.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 790, 447 S.E.2d at 523.
171. 17 Va. App. 562, 563, 440 S.E.2d 411, 411 (1994).
172. Id. at 564, 440 S.E.2d at 412 (citing Greene v. Greene, 223 Va. 210, 288
S.E.2d 447 (1982)).
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further stated that it would only be likely to grant such a leave
under compelling circumstances.'73
In Goodman v. Hamman,'74 the husband appealed the di-
vorce decree granted to his wife, alleging that the pleadings
were insufficient. The court of appeals agreed and reversed the
decree.'75 The husband had originally filed a bill of complaint
for a bed and board divorce, which he later amended to an
absolute divorce. 76 The wife responded to the amended bill of
complaint, denied any misconduct, and moved to dismiss the
husband's complaint; however, she did not file a cross-bill or
any other independent complaint.'" Thereafter, the husband
nonsuited his bill of complaint. 78 The wife objected to the
nonsuit, arguing that if the husband's nonsuit was granted, she
should be permitted to move forward on her earlier "application
for a divorce" pursuant to section 20-121.02.' The trial court
granted the husband's motion for a nonsuit and allowed the
wife to proceed on her "application for a divorce." 8 ' The court
of appeals explained that while section 20-121.02 allows either
party to move for a divorce under section 20-91 without amend-
ing the bill of complaint or cross-bill, the motion itself does not
constitute a bill of complaint or cross-bill.' 8' The motion de-
pends on the bill of complaint or cross-bill in order to append
an added ground for divorce without the costs and inconve-
nience of an amendment.'82 The court of appeals found that
173. Id.
174. 19 Va. App. 71, 72, 448 S.E.2d 677, 678 (1994).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 72-73, 448 S.E.2d at 678.
177. Id. at 73, 448 S.E.2d at 678.
178. Id. The husband asserted an absolute right to nonsuit his action pursuant to
Virginia Code § 8.01-380. Id. at 73, 448 S.E.2d at 679.
179. Id. The wife objected on the grounds that: (1) she had travelled from Texas;
(2) significant resources had been expended in preparation for trial; and (3) her con-
sent to the nonsuit was required. Id.
180. Id. at 74, 448 S.E.2d at 679.
181. Id. at 75, 448 S.E.2d at 679. Virginia Code § 20-121.02 permits either party
in "any divorce suit wherein a bill of complaint or cross-bill prays for a divorce...
under § 20-91 or ... § 20-95, at such time as there exists in either party's favor
grounds for a divorce under § 20-919 ... [to] move the court ... for a divorce ...
on the grounds set out in § 20-919 without amending the bill of complaint or cross-
bill." VA. CODE ANN. § 20-121.02 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
182. Goodman, 19 Va. App. at 75, 448 S.E.2d at 679 (citing McCausey v.
McCausey, 221 Va. 500, 502, 272 S.E.2d 36, 36-37 (1980)).
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the wife's "application for a divorce" was insufficient to satisfy
the procedural requirements of a cross-bill. 8' As the bill of
complaint was nonsuited, no bill of complaint or cross-bill was
before the court, and therefore the wife was unable to pursue
her request for a divorce."
In Toomey v. Toomey," the court of appeals upheld the tri-
al court's award of equitable distribution to the wife eleven
months after the parties' divorce decree became final. The hus-
band filed a bill of complaint requesting a divorce from his wife
on the ground that the parties lived separate and apart for
more than one year. 88 His wife was a non-resident of Virgin-
ia, but was personally served out of state with the com-
plaint.'87 The wife filed no responsive pleadings, and depo-
sitions were taken without notice to the wife." The final di-
vorce decree, which was silent as to spousal support, child cus-
tody, or reservation of equitable distribution, also was entered
without notice to the wife.'89 Although the wife did not appear
before the decree dissolving the marriage was entered, the trial
court granted the wife leave to file a cross-bill seeking equitable
distribution of the husband's military retirement eleven months
later. '9
The court of appeals affirmed the decision, noting that per-
sonal service on the wife had the same effect as an order of
publication.'9' When the ex parte divorce was granted, it was
binding only insofar as it terminated the parties' marital sta-
tus."'92 The court stated that personal rights, including proper-
183. Id. at 75, 448 S.E.2d at 680 (citing Moore v. Moore, 218 Va. 790, 796, 240
S.E.2d 535, 538-39 (1978)).
184. Id.
185. 19 Va. App. 756, 757, 454 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1995).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 757-58, 454 S.E.2d at 736.
190. Id. at 758, 454 S.E.2d at 736.
191. Id. Virginia Code § 8.01-320 provides that personal service may be made upon
a non-resident person outside the Commonwealth. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-320 (Repl.
Vol. 1992). According to the court, service was made in accordance with the statute.
Toomey, 19 Va. App. at 758, 454 S.E.2d at 736. However, the statute provides that
such service "shall have the same effect, and no other, as an order of publication
duly executed." VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-320 (Repl..Vol. 1992).
192. Toomey, 19 Va. App. at 759, 454 S.E.2d at 737.
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ty and support rights, cannot be adjudicated by the court unless
it has in personam jurisdiction.93 Since the court lacked in
personam jurisdiction over the wife prior to entry of the final
decree, the wife's right to pursue equitable distribution was not
terminated.
9 4
In Parish v. Spaulding, 95 the court of appeals clarified the
standards governing an appeal from the juvenile and domestic
relations district court to the circuit court. In the Parish appeal,
the circuit court excluded evidence of events occurring after the
juvenile court hearing.'96 The court of appeals reversed, hold-
ing that "the circuit court was required to consider all relevant
evidence arising prior to the [new] trial." 97 The court of ap-
peals defined a de novo hearing as "'trial anew, with the bur-
den of proof remaining upon the party with whom it rested in
the juvenile court.""98 According to the court of appeals, "[an
appeal to the circuit court ... annuls the judgment of the [ju-
venile court] as completely as if there had been no previous
trial."' 99 The court stated that by statute, the trial de novo
grants every advantage to a litigant that would have been
available if the case been tried originally in the circuit
court."' Therefore, the trial court is required to consider any
relevant evidence that developed prior to the hearing date.2 '
H. Paternity
In Jones v. Division of Child Support Enforcement, 2 the
mother's action to determine paternity and seek child support
against a putative father was reversed and dismissed by the
court of appeals for lack of jurisdiction. The Division of Child
Support Enforcement ("Division"), on behalf of the mother,
193. Id. (citing Gibson v. Gibson, 5 Va. App. 426, 429, 364 S.E.2d 518, 519 (1988)).
194. Id.
195. 20 Va. App. 130, 455 S.E.2d 728 (1995).
196. Id. at 131, 455 S.E.2d at 729.
197. Id
198. Id. at 132, 455 S.E.2d at 729 (quoting Box v. Talley, 1 Va. App. 289, 292,
338 S.E.2d 349, 351 (1986)).
199. Id. (internal quotations marks omitted) (citations omitted).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 132-33, 455 S.E.2d at 729.
202. 19 Va. App. 184, 186, 450 S.E.2d 172, 174 (1994).
1995] 1015
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
brought an action in juvenile court against the putative fa-
ther. °3 The juvenile court dismissed the action.2 The Divi-
sion appealed, and the circuit court ruled that Jones was the
putative father and ordered him to pay child support.2 ' The
father appealed to the court of appeals alleging that the circuit
court never acquired jurisdiction over the appeal from the juve-
nile court because the notice of appeal was not signed by an
attorney for the Division or by the mother.2 6 The court of ap-
peals agreed and dismissed the case, explaining that Rule 8:20
of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia governs the pro-
cedure for appealing a judgment from the juvenile court.0 7
The Division argued that the notice was signed by a "regular
[and] bona-fide employee of the Division."2 8 The court of ap-
peals held that "[tihe rule specifically refers to a 'party' or 'the
attorney for such party" and therefore the rule was not proper-
ly followed.2" The court reiterated that "dismissal will con-
tinue to be the price of failure to comply with mandatory rule
provisions." 10 Even though the father did not raise this argu-
ment at the trial court level, he was allowed to do so on appeal
because he was contesting jurisdiction.21'
In Brooks v. Rogers,2" Rogers, the mother, brought a peti-
tion in juvenile court against a putative father and requested
establishment of paternity and child support. The juvenile court
ordered the parties to submit to DNA and HLA blood test-
203. Id.
204. Id. "[T]he juvenile court [judge] dismissed the case because the Division had
not timely filed the blood test results in the juvenile court." Id.
205. Id. at 186-87, 450 S.E.2d at 174.
206. Id. at 191, 450 S.E.2d at 176.
207. Id. at 191, 450 S.E.2d at 176-77. Rule 8:20 provides that "all appeals shall
be noted in writing. An appeal is noted only upon timely receipt in the clerk's office
of the writing. An appeal may be noted by a party or by the attorney for such par-
ty." Id. at 190-91, 450 S.E.2d at 176 (quoting VA. S. CT. R. 8:20).
208. Id. at 190, 450 S.E.2d at 176.
209. Id. at 191, 450 S.E.2d at 176.
210. Id. at 191, 450 S.E.2d at 176-77 (quoting Towler v. Commonwealth, 216 Va.
533, 535, 221 S.E.2d 119, 121 (1976)).
211. Id. at 191, 450 S.E.2d at 177. "Jurisdiction of a court may be raised by any
party, or by the court, at any time." Id. (citing Martin v. Pittsylvania County Dep't of
Social Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 22, 348 S.E.2d 13, 17 (1986)).
212. 18 Va. App. 585, 587, 445 S.E.2d 725, 726 (1994).
[Vol. 29:9931016
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
ing. 1 Following a subsequent ore tenus hearing, the court
concluded that Brooks was the father, so Brooks appealed.214
At the circuit court hearing, Brooks presented evidence that
he had undergone a vasectomy in 1984.' He also denied hav-
ing "intimate contact of any kind with the mother."216 Addi-
tionally, he "produced medical records which suggested that
[the child] was conceived between January 10 and 17, 1986,
prior to his alleged trysts with Rogers."21 However, the blood
test results showed a 99.75% probability that Brooks was in-
deed the child's father.1 8 The court of appeals ruled that be-
cause the trial court had considered all of the relevant evidence
presented to it on the issue of paternity, its finding was not an
abuse of discretion.' The court of appeals held that the re-
cord disclosed that the trial judge "simply [did not] believe that
there was a vasectomy."2 ' Furthermore, the genetic evidence
was consistent with the mother's testimony and was compelling
proof of paternity.' The court of appeals found that the re-
cord showed by clear and convincing evidence that Brooks was
indeed the father. 2
213. Id.
214. Id
215. Id. at 589, 445 S.E.2d at 727.
216. Id.
217. Id
218. Id
219. Id. at 590, 445 S.E.2d at 727. The court stated that it must adhere to sec-
tions 20-49.1 through 20-49.4 when determining paternity and quoted directly from
section 20-49.4 of the Virginia Code. Id. at 589, 445 S.E.2d at 727.
The standard of proof in any action to establish parenthood shall be clear
and convincing evidence. All relevant evidence on the issue of paternity
shall be admissible. Such evidence may include, but shall not be limited
to, the following- (1) Evidence of ... sexual intercourse between the
known parent and the alleged parent at the probable time of conception;
(2) Medical ... evidence relating to the alleged parentage of the child
based on tests performed by experts . . .; (3) The results of scientifically
reliable genetic tests, including blood tests, if available, weighted with all
the evidence....
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.4 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
220. Brooks, 18 Va. App. at 590, 445 S.E.2d at 728.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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I. Equitable Distribution
1. Waste
The court of appeals adhered strictly to its past definition of
waste. In L.S.C. v. S.A.S.,223 the court of appeals upheld the
trial court's finding that the husband's use of marital funds for
his criminal defense was not waste. The father, who had been
convicted of three felony sexual offenses with minor boys,
21
"withdrew $20,000 from a marital money market account to
cover a portion of his criminal defense fees."2' The court
found that the expenditure was not waste because the
husband's success or failure in defending himself affected the
rights of his family, and the money was spent on an attempt to
try to maintain his freedom and ability to earn.226 The court
of appeals affirmed, reasoning that it had previously "approved
the use of marital funds for living expenses and attorney's fees
in divorce proceedings."227
The refusal to find "waste" was taken even further in Smith
v. Smith.2" In Smith, the "husband admitted to a fifteen-year
extramarital affair with a woman, whom he saw at least once a
year in a variety of locations."2 2' The wife contended "that the
trial court erred in fashioning the equitable distribution award
by refusing to consider [the] husband's dissipation of marital
assets, which she allege[d] occurred as a result of and during
the course of his fifteen-year extramarital affair.210 The court
223. 19 Va. App. 709, 720, 453 S.E.2d 580, 586 (1995); see supra notes 124-139
and accompanying text.
224. L.S.C., 19 Va. App. at 713, 453 S.E.2d at 583.
225. Id. at 719, 453 S.E.2d at 585-86.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 720, 453 S.E.2d at 586. The court stated that "[o]nce the aggrieved
spouse shows that marital funds were either withdrawn or used after the breakdown,
the burden rests with the party charged with dissipation to prove that the money
was spent for a proper purpose." Id. at 719, 453 S.E.2d at 586 (quoting Clements v.
Clements, 10 Va. App. 580, 586, 397 S.E.2d 257, 261 (1990). The court also stated
that "[an improper purpose is one that is 'unrelated to the marriage and in deroga-
tion of the marital relationship at a time when the marriage is in jeopardy.'" Id.
(quoting Alphin v. Alphin, 15 Va. App. 395, 402, 424 S.E.2d 572, 576 (1992)).
228. 18 Va. App. 427, 444 S.E.2d 269 (1994).
229. Id. at 429, 444 S.E.2d at 271.
230. Id. at 430, 444 S.E.2d at 272.
1018 [Vol. 29:993
1995] DOMESTIC RELATIONS 1019
of appeals, relying on Booth v. Booth,23' held that "the chal-
lenged use of funds must be 'in anticipation of divorce or sepa-
ration... [and] at a time when the marriage is in jeopar-
dy." 2 The court declined the wife's request to expand this
definition, confirming that dissipation only occurs when funds
are spent contemporaneously with the marital breakdown."
Therefore, "expenditures made for a fifteen-year period which
were not specifically for the purpose of depleting the marital
estate and where .. there was an irreconcilable breakdown of
the marriage" are not waste.2"
2. Fault
In Donnell v. Donnell," the court of appeals found that the
trial court abused its discretion in awarding the majority of the
parties' assets to the wife. In Donnell, the "[w]ife was awarded
a divorce on the ground of cruelty based upon [the] husband's
misconduct in coercing sexual acts against the parties' daugh-
ters." 5 The husband pled guilty to a misdemeanor and was
incarcerated for one year.237 He was serving his sentence at
the time of the equitable distribution hearing."8 The court
took note that "[during the parties' thirty-four year marriage,
[the] husband contributed seventy-five percent of the cash con-
tributions to the marriage, [while the] wife contributed the re-
231. 7 Va. App. 22, 371 S.E.2d 569 (1988).
232. Smith, 18 Va. App. at 430, 444 S.E.2d at 272 (quoting Booth, 7 Va. App. at
27, 371 S.E.2d at 572).
233. Id. at 431, 444 S.E.2d at 272.
234. Id. at 431, 444 S.E.2d at 272-73. The court of appeals stated that jojur
holding does not allow the husband to benefit financially from his continuing deceit,"
but found that the
husband's pre-separation use of marital fimds in pursuit of his extended
extramarital affair would be 'more appropriately addressed with the cir-
cumstances and factors which contributed to the dissolution of the mar-
riage,' as required under Code § 20-107.3(E)(5), to the extent that it had
any significant impact on the value of the marital estate.
Id. (citing Aster v. Gross, 7 Va. App. 1, 5-6, 371 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1988)). The court
of appeals also found that '[tihe court may also could consider the negative impact of
the affair on the well-being of the family... and the mental condition of the par-
ties." Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN §§ 20-107.3(E)(1), -107.3(E)(4) (Repl. Vol. 1995).
235. 20 Va. App. 37, 39, 455 S.E.2d 256, 257 (1995).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id
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mainder and virtually all of the non-monetary contribu-
tions."29 Despite the husband's contributions, the trial court
gave almost all of the assets to the wife, including a monetary
award in the amount of the husband's half of the net equity in
the house.2'
The court of appeals reversed, stating that the record did not
support the equitable distribution award in this case.241' Rely-
ing on Aster v. Gross,242 the court reasoned that "[e]quitable
distribution is predicated upon the philosophy that marriage
represents an economic partnership ... [and] circumstances
that lead to the dissolution of the marriage but have no effect
upon marital property, its value, or otherwise are not relevant
to determining a monetary award, and need not be consid-
ered."' Furthermore, no evidence in the record supported a
$75,000 monetary award to the wife.2
3. Transmutation
In McDavid v. McDavid,2" the court of appeals upheld the
trial court's finding that real estate purchased by the parties as
tenants by the entirety was sufficiently transmuted to the
husband's separate property. However, a stock, which the hus-
band and wife originally held as tenants by the entirety, was
not transmuted from marital to separate property by a later
transfer to the husband.2 "
One piece of real estate at issue was acquired by the parties
as tenants by the entirety. 247 The wife subsequently deeded
her interest in the property to the husband.'" The court not-
ed that "[she] testified that she did so based on [the] husband's
representations that it was necessary to facilitate a marital
239. Id.
240. Id. at 40, 455 S.E.2d at 257.
241. Id. at 43, 455 S.E.2d at 258.
242. 7 Va. App. 1, 371 S.E.2d 833 (1988).
243. Donnell, 20 Va. App. at 41-42, 455 S.E.2d at 258.
244. Id.
245. 19 Va. App. 406, 411-12, 451 S.E.2d 713, 717 (1994).
246. Id. at 412, 451 S.E.2d at 717-18.
247. Id. at 408, 451 S.E.2d at 715.
248. Id.
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trust he had established several years earlier." 9 The court of
appeals found that the property was transmuted to the
husband's separate property because the wife had signed a deed
of gift transferring her interests to the husband.2 ' The court
explained that "property which is marital may become separate
only through a 'valid, express agreement by the parties."2 1
The deed "provided that the property was to be held by [the]
husband 'in his own right as his separate and equitable estate
as if he were an unmarried man ... free from the control and
marital rights of his present ... spouse."22 The court of ap-
peals found that because this transaction occurred after the
enactment of section 20-155, it was sufficient to rebut the pre-
sumption that property acquired during the marriage with
marital funds is marital property.253
However, the trial court found, and the court of appeals up-
held the ruling, that the wife's stock transfer to the husband in
the marital company was insufficient to transmute the property
to the husband's separate property.' The parties originally
owned the stock as tenants by the entirety, and the wife was
an active participant in the businessY5 The husband testified
that the company's stock was transferred without compensation
in order to make it easier to negotiate with investors, sell the
stock to outsiders, and protect the wife from the company's
creditorsY 6 The court of appeals found that the contents of
the stock transfer agreement, because it contained no language
relating to the disposition of property upon separation or
divorce, was insufficient to transmute the stock from marital to
249. Id.
250. Id. at 412, 451 S.E.2d at 717.
251. Id. at 411, 457 S.E.2d at 716 (quoting Wagner v. Wagner, 4 Va. App. 397,
404, 358 S.E.2d 407, 410 (1987)).
252. Id. Virginia Code § 20-155 is part of the Premarital Agreement Act, which
allows parties to "enter into agreements .. . settling their rights and obligations." VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-155 (Repl. Vol. 1995); see McDavid, 19 Va. App. at 411 n.1, 451
S.E.2d at 717 n.1.
253. McDavid, 19 Va. App. at 411-12, 451 S.E.2d at 717.
254. Id. at 412, 451 S.E.2d at 717-18.
255. Id. at 408, 451 S.E.2d at 715.
256. Id
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separate property as allowed by Wagner. 7 and section 20-
155.58
In McClanahan v. McClanahan,2 59 a husband's testimony
that he caused property to be titled in his and his wife's name
"as a matter of heart" acknowledged an irrevocable gift to the
wife.26" The court of appeals reversed the monetary award to
the husband based on his contribution to the real property that
he alleged was separate property. 6' The husband's parents
conveyed the property in question to the husband and wife as
tenants by the entirety.26 2 The husband testified that his par-
ents intended the gift only for him, and that it was his choice
to title the property jointly.2' Reversing the trial court, the
court of appeals held that the words testified to by the hus-
band, "as a matter of heart," were comparable to the legal con-
sideration of "love and affection," and as such acknowledged an
irrevocable gift. 2' The court found that it was not a partial
gift, but rather was a complete gift as to the entire property
when it was made.265 Therefore, the trial court was not autho-
rized to "revoke [an] irrevocable gift by entry of a monetary
award based upon [the] husband's contribution to that gift."
266
4. Military Pensions
In Cook v. Cook,267 the court of appeals stated that "[i]t is
well settled in Virginia that all pensions, including military
pensions, may be classified as marital property subject to equi-
257. Wagner v. Wagner, 4 Va. App. 397, 358 S.E.2d 407 (1987).
258. McDavid, 19 Va. App. at 412, 451 S.E.2d at 717-18.
259. 19 Va. App. 399, 451 S.E.2d 691 (1994).
260. Id. at 404, 451 S.E.2d at 694 (citing Enright v. Bannister, 195 Va. 76, 81, 77
S.E.2d 377, 380. (1953)).
261. Id. at 405, 451 S.E.2d at 694.
262. Id. at 401-02, 451 S.E.2d at 692.
263. Id. at 403, 451 S.E.2d at 693.
264. Id. at 404, 451 S.E.2d at 694 (citing Enright v. Bannister, 195 Va. 76, 81, 77
S.E.2d 377, 380 (1953)).
265. Id.
266. Id. This case was decided at a time when the "parties' property could not be
divided into part marital and part separate." Id. at 403, 451 S.E.2d at 693 (citing
Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435, 439, 357 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1987)); see VA. CODE ANN. §
107.3(f) (Repl. Vol. 1995) (allowing for retracing of separate property).
267. 18 Va. App. 726, 728, 446 S.E.2d 894, 895 (1994).
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table distribution." In a case of first impression, the court ad-
dressed the husband's assertion that because he was only mar-
ried to his wife for a period of ten years, she was not entitled
to any portion of his pension plan.26 The court of appeals
held that although the husband and wife had not met the "mili-
tary" ten year requirement, it was not a barrier to the court for
dividing the retirement; it was only "a 'factor in determining
how the entitlement will be collected."'269 Therefore, the trial
court did not err in awarding the wife seventeen percent of the
husband's pension payment notwithstanding the fact that the
husband and wife were married for less than ten years.27°
II. STATUTORY CHANGES EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1995
A. Marriage and Marriage Licenses
Virginia Code section 20-14 was amended to allow marriage
licenses to be obtained at any circuit court, regardless of the
county or city of residence.2
Virginia Code section 20-13.1 repealed the section of the code
establishing marriage to a person not domiciled in the Com-
monwealth as determinative of the residency of the other
spouse.272
268. Id. at 730, 446 S.E.2d at 896.
269. Id. (quoting Carranza v. Carranza, 765 S.W.2d 32, 33-34 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989)).
The U.S.F.S.PA (Uniform Services Former Spouses Protection Act), 10 U.S.C. §
1408(a) (1994) "created the 'direct payment mechanism' in § 1408(d)(1) and authorized
the appropriate military finance center to pay the court ordered apportioned share of
a former spouse's military retirement benefits directly to a former spouse if certain
requirements are met." Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Carmody v. Secretary of Navy,
886 F.2d 678, 679 (4th Cir. 1989)). "In Carmody, the Fourth Circuit held that direct
payment of a former spouse's military retirement pay, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §
1408(d)(1)-(2), is contingent upon a marriage of at least ten years." Id. (citation omit-
ted). Direct payment is permitted "only if a former spouse has been 'married to a
military member for at least ten years, and obtain[ed] a court order that is final and
regular on its face that provides for the payment of a specified amount or percentage
of the service member's retirement pay.'" Id. (citation omitted).
270. Id. at 731, 446 S.E.2d at 896.
271. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-14 (Repl. VoL 1995).
272. Act of Mar. 18, 1995, ch. 355, cl. 2.
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B. Child Support
1. Support Arrearages
A court is now required to include an amount for interest on
an arrearage at the judgment interest rate in court-ordered
spousal and child support payments."' Formerly, the request
for interest was left to the person to whom the arrearage was
owed. 4 This new law also requires the Commissioner of So-
cial Services to collect interest on past due support, and speci-
fies the method for computing interest.275
2. Wage Withholding
All new initial child support orders must now include a pro-
vision for wage withholding, unless both parties agree in writ-
ing to an alternate arrangement. 7 ' Wage withholding can also
be avoided if a party demonstrates, and the court finds, "good
cause" for not imposing it.27 This provision expands the pre-
vious requirement involving all cases in which the Department
of Social Services provides support services, to all cases involv-
ing court ordered support. Modification orders may also include
a wage withholding order.278
3. Child Support Guidelines
The legislature has added another deviation factor to rebut
the child support guidelines." 9 Now, when two parties, in per-
son or by counsel, agree to a pendente lite amount of child
273. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-78.2 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
274. Id.
275. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-267 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
276. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-79.2 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
277. Id. In determining good cause, "the court shall consider the obligor's past
financial responsibilities, history of prior payment under any support order, and any
other matter the court considers relevant." Id.
278. Id.
279. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
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support, that amount can later be used to rebut the presump-
tive application of the guidelines."'
Before setting the presumptive amount of child support, the
court, when appropriate, must now consider the willingness and
availability of the noncustodial parent to personally provide
child care for purposes of determining whether child care costs
are necessary or excessive.2 1
The largest change to the child support guidelines will signif-
icantly reduce child support amounts where gross monthly in-
come exceeds $10,000 per month.2  The legislature has low-
ered the percentages used in calculating a payor's support over
this income threshold, which has the effect of reducing the
amount of the payor's obligation.2 s
The court can now also order a person to perform community
service for failure to pay support or willful refusal to comply
with an order entered pursuant to section 20-103 or 20-
107.3.2
C. Divorce
Section 20-103 now gives a court authority to order divorcing
parents to attend educational or informational seminars on the
effects of divorce on minor children.2' Neither parent can use
statements made during the course of these sessions in any
subsequent proceeding.2s
280. Id-
281. Id. § 20-108.2(F).
282. I. § 20-108.2(B).
283. Id.
284. Id. § 20-115.
285. Id. § 20-103(A).
286. Id
1995] 1025

